A major and most important difference between the culture of life and the culture of death is the different ways in which they understand the meaning of human acts. The culture of death understands human acts primarily in terms of what our acts get done in the external world, i.e., it assesses and evaluates human acts in terms of their consequences or states of affairs that they bring about, whereas the culture of life, while recognizing that human acts get things done in the external world, assesses and evaluates them primarily in terms of what they have to say about ourselves, about what they do to us as persons who make ourselves to be the kind of persons we are in and through the acts we freely choose to do every day of our lives.
In this article I will present and criticize the consequentialist
understanding of human acts operative in the culture of death. In a
subsequent article I will present the understanding of human acts as
self-determining and constitutive of personal moral identity operative
in the culture of life.
The new President of the United States, Barack Obama, unfortunately has
the same consequentialist understanding of human acts. This is
illustrated by his ardent championship of abortion and his campaign
pledge to do whatever he can to end any of the restrictions on abortion
that have been won through democratic processes and Supreme Court
decisions after Roe v. Wade.
The Consequentialist Meaning of Human Acts in the Culture of Death
As noted, the culture of death assesses and evaluates human acts
primarily in terms of what those acts get done in the external world,
i.e., in terms of their consequences or the states of affairs their
agents intend to bring about. Consequentialists think that the morally
right action is the one that promises to bring about the greater good
or lesser evil for those concerned and that the way to cope with
difficult situations is to choose the alternative whose consequences
will result in the greater good or lesser evil. They think that this is
more or less self evident, for it would be foolish to choose the lesser
good or greater evil.
Some examples illustrate this way of evaluating human acts. I will use
two, abortion and using new artificial reproductive technologies (ARTs)
to “have a child of one’s own.
First, consider a woman who becomes pregnant despite her precaution in
making use of contraceptives to prevent this from occurring. The
pregnancy could cause very serious problems: she might have to drop out
of school or interrupt a richly rewarding career, there is the
possibility that the “product” of conception may suffer from an
inherited genetic defect; the pregnancy might endanger her health,
psychological as well as biological; if married, the pregnancy could
seriously affect the family’s income, style of life, relations with
children already born, etc. A consequentialist assessment of the
possible outcomes would conclude that having an abortion is the
alternative that promises greater good and lesser evil than continuing
the pregnancy. An abortion would allow the woman, whether married or
single, to avoid the various harms likely to take place should she
continue the pregnancy. This is surely the case if we think, as
consequentialists do, that not all members of the human species are
persons; some are merely biologically alive, but because they lack
exercisable cognitive abilities that are characteristic of persons,
they cannot be regarded as persons. After all, the Supreme Court in Roe
v. Wade refused to recognize the unborn as persons.
Second, consider a couple who cannot generate a child through normal
marital intercourse because the wife’s fallopian tubes are blocked. On
a consequentialist assessment of human acts, it seems that the best
alternative is to help them realize their legitimate desire for a child
of their own by means of homologous in vitro fertilization and embryo
transfer or some other artificial reproductive technology (ART) such as
intracytoplasmic sperm injection. How could this possibly be wrong?
Critique of Consequentialist Meaning of Human Acts
The major problem with this way of understanding human acts is that the
results the agents intend (the “greater good” or “lesser evil” promised
by the acts in question) are not the immediate or “proximate” results
or consequences of the acts in question; they are rather the
“hoped-for” results or consequences whose realization depends on
further human acts and, at times, unforeseen contingencies.
Take the abortion example. The immediate or “proximate” result of
abortion is the death of a human being (=human person) during the
embryonic or fetal stage of its development caused by its intentional
killing. The “hoped-for benefits” will come about if and only if the
woman continues her education or career, and she may not if she has an
accident and is seriously injured or if an aggressive co-worker is
given the advancement for which she is working, or if and only if the
married woman’s husband does not divorce her or she him or if and only
if their children, perhaps their only child, does not die in an
accident or of a disease. One might object that such contingencies and
subsequent human acts (a co-worker getting the advancement for which
she is working) are hypothetical and not realistic, but the fact
remains that the promised “benefits” of the abortion will occur, not as
the direct and immediate result of the act of abortion but only if
other human acts and unforeseen events do not occur.
And what of the couple advised to generate life in the laboratory
through various artificial reproductive technologies (ARTs) because
they can not generate life by engaging in marital intercourse on
account of the wife’s blocked fallopian tubes? Here the “hoped-for”
benefit that employing these technologies promises may well not be
attained and, if attained, only at a terrible cost. The immediate
consequence of resorting to ARTs is not the “hoped for” baby in the
arms of its mother and father. It is rather a human being at the
earliest stage of its development, i.e., as a zygote; it remains in the
laboratory until several days have passed and it is at the blastocyst
stage of development before it is implanted in a woman’s womb. The
“success rates” of ARTs are not very high; they are highest for women
under 35 (including “surrogate women” in whom embryos are implanted in
addition to the wives whose fallopian tubes are blocked), around 30
percent, and are far less in women 38 to 40 plus years old, around 6 to
20 percent (for this see
http://www.americanpregnancy.org/infertility/ivf.html , a website
touting the virtews of ART). More conservative and realistic estimates
are that only 25 percent of children conceived in vitro or through
intracytoplasmic sperm injection survive until birth (on this see
http://www.christendom-awake.org/pages/may/patrickcarrr.htm ).
Moreover, there is growing evidence that the lives and health of
children conceived through ARTs are disproportionately at risk for
serious harms. One study found that infants conceived with artificial
reproductive technology were more likely to be delivered by Caesarean
section, to have a low birth weight and to be born before term. When
multiple births were excluded this increased likelihood was of a
significant order. Of the infants conceived by intracytoplasmic sperm
injection, 8.6% had a major birth defect diagnosed in their first
year. Of those conceived by in vitro fertilization the percentage was
similar (9%). Of those who were conceived naturally the incidence of
major birth defects diagnosed in the first year was only 4.2%.
Overall, the study showed that infants conceived as a result of ARTs
were more than twice as likely to have a major birth defect than
naturally conceived infants (see Laura Schieve, Susan Meikle, Cynthia
Ferre, et al., “Low and Very Low Birth Weight in Infants Conceived with
the use of Assisted Reproductive Technology,” The New England Journal
of Medicine, 2002 Vol. 346, 731-737). Other studies provide further
evidence.
In addition, in order to increase the likelihood that an embryo
produced in the laboratory will implant in the mother’s womb (either
that of a wife or a surrogate) the woman from whom an oocyte is
retrieved is given fertility drugs so that several oocytes can be
retrieved, then fertilized in the laboratory, with 3 or more embryos
implanted and others cryopreserved for future use either for research
or implantation or then destroyed. If more than one embryo implants, to
reduce risk of low birth rate because of multiple pregnancies, excess
embryos are aborted under a procedure euphemistically called
”pregnancy reduction.”
Conclusion
The consequentialist methodology operative in the culture of death is
utterly flawed because the alleged “greater good” or “lesser evil”
promised by choosing to do specific kinds of deeds (e.g., abortion,
engendering a child in the laboratory, embryonic stem cell research,
etc.) are in no way guaranteed by the act chosen but are rather
projected “hoped for” benefits. This method actually conceals from view
or ignores totally the human act chosen and done here and now (e.g.,
the intentional killing of a human person at the embryonic stage of its
development, the “production” of a child in the laboratory, etc.).
(c) 2009 Culture of Life Foundation. Reproduction granted with attribution required.
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